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Atchison: Atchison: Hancock Amendment

The Hancock Amendment, User Fees, the
Plain Meaning Rule, and an Invitation
to Challenge Buechner v. Bond
Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to the Missouri
Constitution. The amendment, commonly called the Hancock Amendment,2
limited the power of state and local governments to raise taxes by requiring
voter approval for tax increases and by Placing a spending limit on the state
government.3
The types of increases prohibited without voter approval have been the
subject of controversy. One of the controversial issues has been whether fees
charged for governmental services may be raised without a vote.4 Initially,
the Missouri Supreme Court, employing the plain meaning rule, held that such
fees could not be raised without voter consent.5 Keller v. Marion County
Ambulance District,the subject of this Note, marks a welcome change of that
position, and a more rational approach to constitutional construction.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1974, the Marion County Ambulance District was organized under
Missouri's Ambulance District Law.6 The voters of the ambulance district
approved a doubling of the property tax rate in 1986;" such voter approval
was required by the Hancock Amendment.' In early 1989, the ambulance
district established a new schedule of charges for services rendered, with most
of the charges representing increases over previous rates. The new schedule
of charges was not submitted to district voters for approval.' A group of
taxpayers who resided in the district sued, claiming that the increases violated
the Hancock Amendment because voter approval was not obtained." The
circuit court agreed with the taxpayers, holding that the charges were "fees"

1. 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Mo. CONST., art. X, §§ 16, 18 (1980).
4. See Keller, 820 S.W.2d 301; Roberts v. McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1982).
5. Roberts, 636 S.W.2d at 332.
6. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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for purposes of Section 22(a) of the Hancock Amendment, 2 and were
therefore subject to voter approval. 3 The ambulance district's failure to get
voter approval made the fee increases unconstitutional.14 On transfer, the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed." The court held that the char es in
question were user fees rather than "fees" that were in reality taxes.' s The
court held that the amount to charge users of services should be determined
by those elected to run such "quasi-governmental organizations,"' 7 and not
the people of the district.'"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. ConstitutionalConstructionin Missouri
Over the last several decades, the Missouri Supreme Court has developed
rules courts must use in the construction of constitutions. Many of these rules
were spelled out in Boone County Court v. State.'9 Generally, courts
construe constitutional provisions using the same rules used in statutory
construction, but constitutional provisions are to be given a broader construction because of their more permanent nature.2"
The court's fundamental role in interpreting a constitutional provision is
to give effect to the intent of the voters who approved the provision." The
voters are presumed to have intended that words carry their ordinary and usual

12. Mo. CONST., art. X, § 22 (1980). Section 22(a) provides in part:
Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from levying any tax,
license or fees, not authorized by law, charter or self-enforcing provisions of the
constitution when this section is adopted or from increasing the current levy of an
existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy authorized by law or charter
when this section is adopted without the approval of the required majority of the
qualified voters of that county or other political subdivision voting thereon.
Id.
13. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 305.
17. Id. at 304 n.6. ("These are organizations set up by governments to fulfill purposes
inadequately served by private organizations."). The court listed the following as examples of
quasi-governmental organizations: ambulance districts, community mental health services,
conservancy districts, county airport authorities, county health centers, county library districts,
hospital districts, junior college districts, metropolitan park and museum districts, nursing home
districts, public water supply districts, school districts, and special business districts. Id. at 304.
18. Id. at 305.
19. 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1982).
20. Id. at 324.
21. Id.
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meanings. 2 The dictionary determines the "ordinary, usual and commonly
understood meaning."23

The grammatical word order used and the selection of associated words
also indicate meaning.' With regard to both, the intent of the provision's
drafters is influential, but ultimately of less importance than any intent derived
from the voters who approved the provision.2 ' A court may look to the title
of the provision when interpreting it.26 Context, too, is an important
consideration: "Due regard is given to the primary objectives of the provision
in issue as viewed in harmony with all related provisions, considered as a
whole."27 Finally, Missouri courts have long employed the common law
"plain meaning" rule by holding that the meaning apparent on the face of the
constitution is controlling, and no forced or unnatural construction is
permissible.28
B. Interpretationsof the.Hancock Amendment
Missouri courts have had relatively few opportunities to analyze the type
of tax/fee distinction at issue in Keller.29 Prior to Keller, the most important
of these cases was Roberts v. McNary. 0 The Roberts case provided the
Missouri Supreme Court with its first opportunity to determine whether "user
fees" were covered by the "tax, license or fees" language of the Hancock
Amendment3 ' and, thus, subject to a vote of the people before an could
increase. Roberts centered around St. Louis County's proposed budget for
1982.32 The proposed budget included fee increases for some county
services, including parks and building inspection.33 The St. Louis County
Council approved the budget without a popular vote. 4
A resident taxpayer sought a declaration that the St. Louis County
Council's action violated the Hancock Amendment. 35 Relying on Webster's
Dictionary,36 the Missouri Supreme Court read the "tax, license or fees"

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 325.
27. Id. at 324.
28. Wenzlaff v. Lawton, 653 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Mo. 1983); Heimberger v. Board of
Curators of Univ. of Mo., 188 S.W. 128, 130 (Mo. 1916).
29. See Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1991); Roberts v. McNary, 636
S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1982).
30. 636 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1982).
31. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 22(a) (1980).

32. Roberts, 636 S.W.2d at 334.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The dictionary defined the word "fee" as "'a fixed charge for admission; a charge fixed
by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services; a charge fixed by law for services
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language broadly to mean that the Hancock Amendment imposed sweeping
limitations on government's ability to raise fees of any sort without voter
approval.37
A more recent case on this issue is Zahner v. City of Perryville."
Perryville, Missouri had a street construction policy which required abutting
property owners to pay the initial cost of paving an unpaved street.39 As a
result of the policy, Clarence L. Zahner was required to pay over $1,600
under a "special tax assessment bill" for improvements to a street abutting his
property. There was no vote of the people of Perryville." Zahner filed
suit, claiming that the assessment violated the Hancock Amendment.42 The
Missouri Supreme Court found that the charge assessed to Mr. Zahner did not
fit the dictionary definition of a "tax" or a "fee" because the charge was not
"a fixed charge for admission; a charge fixed by law or by an institution for
certain privileges or services; [or] a charge fixed by law for services of a
public officer."43 Instead, the court held that the charge was a "special
assessment" and, therefore, did not require a vote of the people in order to
satisfy the Hancock Amendment."
A case having nothing to do with the distinction between taxes and fees,
but still extremely important in the history of interpreting the Hancock
Amendment, is Buechner v. Bond." Buechner dealt with an action for
declaratoryjudgment sought by Missouri State Representatives John Buechner
and Wayne Goode.46 Buechner and Goode sought a declaratory judgment
that Governor Bond's inclusion of unspent revenue from the 1979-80 fiscal
year in "total state revenues"" was improper for purposes of calculating the
revenue limit under Section 18 of the Hancock Amendment. 4 The way in

of a public officer."' Roberts, 636 S.W.2d at 335 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INrERNATiONAL DICTnONARY (1965)).
37. Id. at 335-36.
38. 813 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1991).
39. Id. at 857.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 858-59.
44. Id. at 859.
45. 650 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1983).
46. Id. at 612.
47. As used in §§ 16-24 of Article X:
(1) "'Total state revenues" includes all general and special revenues, license and fees,
excluding federal funds, as defined in the budget message of the governor for fiscal
year 1980-1981. Total state revenues shall exclude the amount of any credits based
on actual tax liabilities or the imputed tax components of rental payments, but shall
include the amount of any credits not related to actual tax liabilities.
MO. CONST. art. X, § 17 (1981).
48. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 612. Section 18(a) provides in full:
There is hereby established a limit on the total amount of taxes which may be
imposed by the general assembly in any fiscal year on the taxpayers of this state.
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which that unspent revenue was characterized would partially determine what
the state's revenue limit would be.4 9 The unspent revenue amounted to
approximately $416 million."' If included in "total state revenues," it would
raise Missouri's revenue limit."' The higher the revenue for fiscal year
1980-81, the more money the state government could collect without voter
approval. 2
The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the unspent revenue from
the 1979-80 fiscal year should not be included in "total state revenues." 3
Instead of relying on the definition of "total state revenues" set out in Article
X, Section5 17," the court looked to the dictionary for the definition of
"revenue." The court held that "[r]evenue is that amount generated in a
given fiscal year,"5" thereby excluding the unspent revenue from "total state
revenues" and reducing the amount of money the state government could
collect without voter approval.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. The Majority Opinion
Judge Benton wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Judge Robertson
and Judges Blackmar and Thomas joined. The majority noted that the most
important objective of constitutional construction is to "give effect to the

Effective with fiscal year 1981-82, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the general
assembly shall not impose taxes of any kind which, together with all other revenues
of the state, federal fuids excluded, exceed the revenue limit established in this
section. The revenue limit shall be calculated for each fiscal year and shall be equal
to the product of the ratio of total state revenues in fiscal year 1980-81 divided by
the personal income of Missouri in calendar year 1979 multiplied by the personal
income of Missouri in either the calendar year prior to the calendar year in which
appropriations for the fiscal year for which the calculation is being made, or the
average of personal income of Missouri in the previous three calendar years,
whichever is greater.

Mo. CONST. art. X, § 18(a) (1980).
49. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 612.
50. Edward D. Robertson, Jr. & Duncan E. Kincheloe, M, Missouri's Tax Limitation
Amendment: AdAstra PerAspera, 52 UMKC L. RPv. 1, 4 (1983).
51. Id.
52. See supra note 48 for the full text of § 18(a).
53. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 613.
54. Mo. CONST., art. X, § 17 (1980).
55. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 613.
56. Id.
57. See Robertson & Kincheloe, supra note 50, at 4.
58. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 301, 305.
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intent of the voters who adopted the Amendment" 9 and stressed the
importance of looking at words in context."
The majority explained that Article X, Section 16 is the Hancock
Amendment's principal clause, and that the Amendment's other provisions
exist to "implement" Section 16.61 The majority held that the limit on
"spending" referred to in section 1662 applied only to the state government,63 and concluded that "there are two types of local revenue increases:
those subject to the Hancock Amendment and those not subject to the
Amendment." 64
The majority pointed out that the terms "license" and "fees" are
65
mentioned in conunction with revenue twice in the Hancock Amendment.
In Section 17(1) the terms are used in the definition 67
of total state revenue,68
In Section 22(a)
and as alternatives to "general and special revenues."
the terms are mentioned as alternatives to a "tax" in a list of increases that
local governments are forbidden to make without voter approval.69 The
majority suggested that the differences in these sections suggest a narrow
definition of "fees" as used in Section 22(a), and a general term like "revenue"
should have been used if the people of Missouri actually intended that no
increases in revenue of any kind be allowed without their approval.70
According to the majority, the fact that "fees" are characterized as an
alternative to taxes "suggests that what is prohibited are fee increases that are
taxes in everything but name. What is allowed are fee increases which are
'general and special revenues' but not a 'tax."' 7

59. Id. at 302.
60. Id. Judge Benton wrote: "Context determines meaning. Consider this sentence: The
batter flew out. Without knowing context, one cannot determine whether that sentence describes
what happened when the cook tripped while carrying a bowl of cake mix, or the final act of a
baseball game." Id.
61. Id. Article X, § 16 provides:
Property taxes and other local taxes and state taxation and spending may not be
increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as
provided by this constitution. The state is prohibited from requiring any new or
expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state
financing, or from shifting the tax burden to counties and other political subdivisions. A provision for emergency conditions is established and the repayment of
voter approved bonded indebtedness is guaranteed. Implementation of this section
is specified in sections 17 through 24, inclusive of this article.
MO. CONST. art. X, § 16 (1980) (emphasis added).
62. The full text of art. X, § 16 is set out supra note 61.
63. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302-03.
64. Id. at 303.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 47 for the full text of § 17(1).
67. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303.
68. Mo. CoNsT., art. X, § 22(a) (1980).
69. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303. See supra note 12 for the text of § 22(a).
70. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303.
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The majority also found it persuasive that Section 2272 prohibited the

"levying" of a "tax, license or fee" without voter approval.73 According to

74
the majority, in common usage, taxes are levied, but fees are charged.
They took this to suggest that the fees referred to in Section 22 were actually
taxes, since fees are not ordinarily "levied.01
Citing Zahner v. City of Perryville,76 the majority noted that user fees
generally are not considered taxes.77 Accordingly, they held that the
Hancock Amendment does not prohibit shifting the expenses of services
provided by special districts and quasi-governmental organizations to those

who actually use them.78

The majority also provided a list of criteria to help determine whether a
revenue increase is subject to the voter approval requirement of the Hancock
Amendment. 79 The criteria include when the fee is paid, who pays the fee,

72.
73.
74.
75.

See supra note 12 for the text of § 22(a).
Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303.
Id.
Id.

76. 813 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Mo. 1991).
77. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303-04.
78. Id. at 304.
79. Id. at 304 n.10. The majority wrote:
In order to determine whether a revenue increase by a local government is an
increase in a "tax, license or fees" that requires voter approval under the Hancock
Amendment, the following are critical:
1) When is the fee paid?-Fees subject to the Hancock Amendment are
likely due to be paid on a periodic basis while fees not subject to the
Hancock Amendment are likely due to be paid only on or after
provision of a good or service to the individual paying the fee.
2) Who pays the fee?-A fee subject to the Hancock Amendment is
likely to be blanket-billed to all or almost all of the residents of the
political subdivision while a fee not subject to the Hancock Amendment
is likely to be charged only to those who actually use the good or
service for which the fee is charged.
3) Is the amount of the fee to be paid affected by the level of goods or
services provided to the fee payer?-Fees subject to the Hancock
Amendment are less likely to be dependent on the level of goods or
services provided to the fee payer while fees not subject to the Hancock
Amendment are likely to be dependent on the level of goods or services
provided to the fee payer.
4) Is the government providing a service or good?-If the government
is providing a good or service, or permission to use government
property, the fee is less likely to be subject to the Hancock Amendment.
If there is no good or service being provided, or someone unconnected
with the government is providing the good or service, then any charge
required by and paid to a local government is probably subject to the
Hancock Amendment.
5) Has the activity historically and exclusively been provided by the
government?-If the government has historically and exclusively
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whether the government is providing goods or services, and whether the
government has historically and exclusively provided the good or service."
Finally, the majority stated that Roberts has been overruled sub silentio
by other cases to the extent that it holds that all revenue increases, including
those labeled as "fee" increases, require voter approval under the Hancock
Amendment.8 The majority stated that the precedential value82 of Roberts
was minimal because it attempts to define "fees" out of context.
B. The Dissent
Judge Holstein authored the dissenting opinion in Keller and was joined
by Judges Covington and Rendlen."3 The dissent declared that "the majority
nullifies the express intent of the voters who adopted [Article X, Section

22(a)].""
The dissent's first point of contention was the manner in which the
majority construed the terms of Section 22(a).5 The dissent said that the
precedent relied on by the majority for rules of constitutional construction86
did not suggest that context should deprive words of meanings as defined in
the dictionary. 7 The dissent alleged that the majority made no attempt to
read "fees" so as to give it its "dictionary meaning."88
The dissent stated that rules of construction employed by the majority
were unnecessary because the majority failed to demonstrate that the word

provided the good, service, permission or activity, the fee is likely
subject to the Hancock Amendment. If the government has not
historically and exclusively provided the good, service, permission or
activity, then any charge is probably not subject to the Hancock
Amendment.
Based on these criteria, property taxes, sales taxes, franchise taxes,
and income taxes, among others, are subject to the Hancock Amendment. The above criteria are helpful in examining charges denominated
as something other than a tax. No specific criterion is independently
controlling; but, rather, the criteria together determine whether the
charge is closer to being a "true" user fee or a tax denominated as a fee.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 305. The court cited the following cases as overruling Roberts sub silentio:
Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1991); Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n v. J.E.
Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989); Pace v. City of Hannibal, 680 S.W.2d 944 (Mo.
1984).
82. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 305.
83. Id.
84. Id. (Holstein, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Boone County Ct. v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1982); McDermott v. Nations, 580
S.W.2d 249 (Mo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 901, and cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 958 (1979).
87. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 306 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
88. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss4/8

8

Atchison: Atchison: Hancock Amendment
1992]

THE HANCOCK AMENDMENT

1381

"fees" as used in the Hancock Amendment is ambiguous.89 Where there is
no ambiguity in a constitutional provision, there should be no reliance on the
Additionally, the dissent said that if the terms
rules of construction.'
"taxes," "licenses," and "fees" were really intended to convey the same
meaning, only one of them would be necessary, and there would be no reason
to include the others. 9'
The dissenters also took exception to the majority's notion that "fees" are
not "levied," calling it "an exercise in wishful thinking."92 They cited a
legion of cases that contained examples of "fees" being "levied."9"
The dissent stated that the majority ignored the precedent of Roberts.94
The Roberts court had adopted a dictionary definition of "fees," as "[a] fixed
charge for admission; a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain
privileges or services; [or] a charge fixed by law for services of a public
officer."95 The dissent noted that the.Roberts court determined the plain and
ordinary
meaning of "fees," finding no need to apply the rules of construction.96
The dissent rejected the majority's claim that Roberts had been overruled
sub silentio, noting that the cases cited by the majority had actually cited
Roberts with approval and relied upon it.97 The dissent stated that if the
majority wished to reject the holding of Roberts "it is far preferable to do so
by the front door of reason rather than the amorphous back door of sub
silentio.98
The dissent went on to say that if there were ambiguity in the Hancock
Amendment, it exists in Section 1699 rather than in Section 22(a)"° .
According to the dissent, the phrase "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes and
state taxation and spending may not be increased"'' is ambiguous because
it is unclear Whether "spending" applies only to the state, or to both state and

89. Id.
90. Id. (citing E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
298 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo. 1957)).

91. Id.
92. Id. at 307.
93. Id. Among the cases cited by the dissent are: Carpenterv. King, 679 S.W.2d 866, 867
(Mo. 1984); Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville Sch. Dist., 548 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Mo. 1977);
Automobile Club of Mo. v. City of St. Louis, 334 S.W.2d 355, 362 (Mo. 1960); Fetter v. City
of Richmond, 142 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo. 1940).
94. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 307 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 307-08 (citing Roberts v. McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. 1982).
96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. See Zahner, 813 S.W.2d at 858; Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n v. J.E. Dunn Constr.
Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 76-77 (Mo. 1989); Pace v. City of Hannibal, 680 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Mo.
1984).
98. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 308 (Holstein, J. dissenting).
99. Mo. CONST., art. X, § 16 (1980). The full text of § 16 is set out supra note 61.
100. Keller,820 S.W.2d at 309 (Holstein, J., dissenting) (citing Mo. CONST., art. X, § 22(a)
(1980)). The relevant portion of § 22(a) is quoted supra note 12.
101. Mo. CoNsT., art X, § 16 (1980).
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local governments."° The dissent contended that the "specific" language in
Section 22(a) should prevail over the "general" language of Section 16. 03
The dissent also tried to find the intent of the voters by looking at the
ballot title of the Hancock Amendment."° The ballot title informed voters
that the amendment "prohibits local tax or fee increases without a popular
vote."'0 5 The dissent interpreted this as suggesting that the voters intended
to do more than limit the government's power to raise taxes."°
V.

COMMENT

A. Righting the Wrong of Roberts
1. The Value of Voter Intent
Under ideal circumstances, the dissenters in Keller would be correct in
asserting that the most important determination to be made is what the voters
who ratified the Hancock Amendment intended.0 7 Although some argue
there is no such thing as the intent of a voting body,' if it could be
determined that voters intended to achieve a specific result by voting for a
constitutional amendment such intent should be given effect.0 9 However,
in a case such as this, making an accurate determination of the voters' intent
is a difficult if not impossible, task. It would be unrealistic to say that all
those who favored the Hancock Amendment intended the same thing.
Different voters were certain to perceive the Amendment differently. Some
were probably influenced by advertisements, others by newspaper and
television stories, and still others by the opinions of friends and family. Many
may have read the Amendment in its entirety, while most probably had not.
Also making the intent of the voters difficult to ascertain is that this issue
dealt not with Section 16, the principal provision of the Amendment, but with
the latter, more minor provisions. The Hancock Amendment was popularly
known as the "tax limit amendment" or the "tax lid amendment.""10 It

102. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 309 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 309-10.
104. Id. at 310.
105. Id. (quoting Roberts v. McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Mo. 1982)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. "There is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even
in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be invented." Ronald Dworkin, The
Forum ofPrinciple,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 477 (1981). Logically, this position would extend
to the intention of the voters who ratify a constitutional amendment.
109. "Ifa court is reasonably sure what the legislators were driving at... a refusal to give
effect to their purposes because they did not dot every i and cross every I is defensible only if
one has some principled objection to legislation in general." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 291 (1990). This should be equally true if a court is reasonably
sure of the voters' purpose in ratifying the amendment.
110. Rhonda C. Thomas, The Hancock Amendment: The Limits Imposed on Local
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seems unlikely that the voters contemplated the types of issues raised in Keller
and Roberts, which deal with charges not commonly thought of as "taxes," and
even less likely they fully comprehended the wording of the Amendment.
Nevertheless, the voters did enact the Amendment complete with its wording,
and this wording should be given some effect.
2. Context vs. Plain Meaning
To determine the meaning of "tax, license or fees" in Section 22 of the
Hancock Amendment,"' it is crucial to look at the terms in context. The
majority's statement that "[c]ontext determines meaning" is accurate." 2 The
words in the Hancock Amendment, like any other document, do not exist in
a vacuum. They act together synergistically to create meanings which they
alone cannot convey."' They modify and explain each other. Section
16"' states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes and state taxation and
spending may not be increased above the limitations specified herein without
direct voter approval as provided by this constitution."'1 5 It goes on to say
that "[i]mplementation of this section is specified in sections 17 through 24,
inclusive of this article."" 6 Nowhere in Section 16 is a reference made to
"licenses" or "fees." It only speaks of "taxes." Since this section specifically
refers to the subsequent sections as "implementation," it strains reason to
contend that the intent could be found in a provision other than Section 16.
The sections following Section 16 tend to be technical, including matters such
as the definition of terms," 7 an explanation of how the revenue limit is
set," and a description of who may have standing to bring an action to
enforce the provisions of the Hancock Amendment." 9 Section 16 is what
the Hancock Amendment is about. Sections 17 through 24 make it work.
The dissent rejected the majority's contextual reading of "tax, license or
fees" and stated that "[t]he meaning apparent on the face of the constitution

Governments, 52 UMKC L. REv. 22, 31 n.28 (1983).
111. Mo. CONST., art. X, § 22 (1980).
112. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302.
113. Judge Patricia M. Wald of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has written,
Words do mean different things in different contexts.... To stop at the purely
literal meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence-if indeed the purely literal meaning
can be found-ignores reality. In the context of the statute, other related statutes,
or the problems giving rise to the statute, words may be capable of many different
meanings, and the literal meaning may be inapplicable or nonsensical.
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IoWA L. REV. 195, 199 (1982).
114. MO. CONST., art. X, § 16 (1980).

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.

Id. § 17.
Id. § 18.
Id. § 23.
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is controlling and no forced or unnatural construction is permissible."' 110
Although they did not use the term, the dissent's position is a restatement of
the "plain meaning" rule, a doctrine that has fallen out of the favor of the
American judiciary.' The plain meaning rule ignores the dynamic quality
of language and assumes that the meanings of words remain the same despite
changes in context. An acontextual reading is more likely to strip a statute or
constitutional provision of its meaning than the type of reading employed by
the majority which considers the total text. The dissent's method incorrectly
removes terms from the context that help to define them.
By relying so heavily on context in construing the terms of the Hancock
Amendment, the majority seems to reject the plain meaning rule, though it
does not do so expressly." Greater reliance on context and less reliance on
elusive "plain meanings" in interpreting statutes and constitutional provisions
would be a positive step for Missouri courts.
3. "License or Fees" as Surplus Language
The dissent's strongest point is that including the terms "license" and
"fees" in Section 22(a) would be superfluous if the drafters intended only
limits on the increases of "taxes."'" Clearly, if only the word "taxes" were
included in that section there would be little question that the type of user fees
at issue in Keller would be beyond the scope of the Hancock Amendment.
However, since the "license" and "fees" language was included, it must either
be explained or conceded to evidence an intent that these types of charges may
not be raised without the approval of the voters. Judge Posner has called
24
"dubious" the type of nonsurplusage construction employed by the dissent,
since it overlooks the fact that seemingly superfluous language may be used
for a variety of reasons, such as emphasis or inadvertence,' or an attempt

120. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 307 (Holstein, J., dissenting) (citing Wentzlaffv. Lawton, 653
S.W.2d 215, 216 (Mo. 1983); State ex rel. Heimberger v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
188 S.W. 128 (Mo. 1916)).
121. Judge Posner has said that
the plain-meaning canon ... seems to imply that the way to read a text is first
acontextually, and only if this reading produces puzzlement to consider its context.
This is not the way people do or should read, and here it should be noted that the
parallel approach in contract interpretation, which forbids inquiry into context if the
words of the contract are plain, is largely discredited.
Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer,68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 442
(1989). Judge Wald has written that the "[plain meaning] rule has effectively been laid to
rest.'... When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it becomes a device not for ignoring
legislative history but for shifting onto legislative history the burden of proving that the words
do not mean what they appear to say." Wald, supra note 113, at 199.
122. See Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302-03.
123. Id. at 306 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
124. Posner, supranote 121, at 442.
125. Id.
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to be as thorough as possible. 6 Such a nonsurplusage construction seems
especially dubious if there is evidence that can explain the seemingly
superfluous language. The majority relied on the drafters' notes from the
Hancock Amendment to help explain the language. 7 The notes explain
that it was not the intent of the drafting committee "to include user charges
that are specific charges for services rendered" among the sources of revenue
described in section 22." Also included in the notes was the statement that
"[t]he drafters feel that final court interpretation will validate the intent of the
section and will not require voter approval for increases or decreases in
charges ... [which could be construed as a user fee] by local political
subdivisions."' 29 These statements support the Keller majority's position
that "what is prohibited are fee increases that are taxes in everything but
name." 3 While the dissenters ideally are correct in asserting that "[t]he
material inquiry is ...not what the drafters meant to say, but ... what the
voters intended,"'' in a case such as this where the intent of the voters is
nearly impossible to discern, the reasoning of the drafters can be helpful in
clearing up ambiguities 3 2 and identifying plausible readings of the text other
than the so-called "plain meaning."

126. An explanation of the "tax, license or fees" language was offered by Rihonda C.
Thomas in 1981, before the Missouri courts had addressed the issue, when she suggested that
[t]he drafters may have feared that the term "tax" was too narrow and could be
interpreted by the courts to apply to only the property tax, the sales tax and other
municipal charges labeled as taxes. Addition of the terms "license or fees" was
intended to assure that all charges, regardless of their form or label, imposed by a
city pursuant to its power to tax would be limited. Certainly, a lay person drafting
or endorsing this initiative amendment might have thought the addition of the
"license or fees" phrase necessary to assure coverage of a business license fee or a
motor vehicle sticker fee imposed as a tax.
Rhonda C. Thomas, Recent Developments in Missouri: Local Government Taxation, 49 UMKC
L. REv. 491, 503 (1981).
127. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 304.
128. Id. at 304 n.8. The Drafters' Notes are more fully set out in Robertson & Kincheloe,
supra note 50.
It was not the intent of the drafting committee when using the words "taxes, license
or fees" to include user charges that are specific charges for services rendered. This
would include the charge for the collection of garbage, admissions to public
swimming pools, library fines, the price of school lunches, and any and all charges
to the public which could be construed as a user fee. The drafters feel that final
court interpretation will validate the intent of the section and will not require voter
approval for increases or decreases in charges of this type by local political
subdivisions.
Id. at 19.
129. Id.
130. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303.
131. Id. at 310 (Holstein, J.,
dissenting).
132. Boone County Ct. v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Mo. 1982).
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4. Taxpayer Standing
A close reading of the Hancock Amendment yields another clue which
suggests that only taxes are covered by the Amendment. Under Section
23 11 "any taxpayer of the state, county or other political subdivision shall
have standing to bring suit ... to enforce the provisions of sections 16

through 22[.]'0 3 The Amendment fails to give payers of fees and licenses
such standing. Such an omission suggests that the Hancock Amendment
implicates the interests of taxpayers but not payers of other governmentally
imposed charges. 135 If the Amendment was intended to cover licenses and
fees, then, logically, those upon whom these charges are imposed would be
granted standing to enforce the amendment's provisions.
That these
people are not granted standing implies that the Hancock Amendment does not
restrict government's ability to impose or raise licenses and fees.
5. Which Title Do You Trust?
While the dissent pointed out that the Hancock Amendment's ballot title
stated that the Amendment "prohibits local tax or fee increases without a
popular vote,"' 37 it declined to refer to the title of the petition circulated to
place the Hancock Amendment on the ballot. The title of the petition used the
term "taxation" twice without using the term "fees." 38 In fact, on the front
of the petition, the terms "tax," "taxes," and "taxation" appeared thirteen times,
without a single appearance of "license" or "fees."'39 The only provision of
the Hancock Amendment set out on the front of the petition was Section 16,
with the full body of the Amendment set out in small print on the back. 4 '
Also, there was a direct reference to Section 22: "Local government must get
voter approval before it can levy any new taxes. (See Sec. 22)."'' It says
nothing about needing voter approval for increases in fees. There was even

133. Mo. CONST., art. X, § 23 (1980).
134. Id.
135. See Thomas, supra note 110, at 31 n.28. The article states:
Implicit in the limitation of standing to taxpayers is a reading that the
amendment's provisions are a limit on taxes. If the amendment's framers had
intended its "lid" to cover all municipal charges, then logically any individual
required to pay a new or increased city charge (e.g., a city sewer charge) would be
granted standing to challenge imposition of the charge as violative of Hancock.

Id.
136. Id.
137. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 310 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
138. Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Mo. 1981). The title used on the petition
appeared as follows: "An amendment to the Constitution of the State of Missouri amending
Article X of the Constitution relating to taxation including but not limited to, limitations on
taxation and governmental expenditures and the effectuation of such purpose." Id.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 24, 25.
141. Id. at 25.
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a direction to return the petitions to "Taxpayer's Survival Association"1 2
and a characterizationof the Amendment as a "constitutional tax and spending
limitation amendment."'" Any suggestion that the Hancock Amendment's
ballot title (which voters probably read for the first time at the polling place
after having already made up their minds) is stronger evidence of voter intent
than the language of the petition that put the Amendment on the ballot (about
which the people had several months to think) is less than convincing. The
intent to be derived from these sources is at least ambiguous. At most, it is
evidence that the people of Missouri wanted to limit government's power to
raise taxes and probably did not consider the types of fee increases at issue in
Roberts and Keller.
It is somewhat hard to believe the notion that the people of Missouri
intended that an election should be required every time a municipality wanted
to charge more for a dog license or to raise the price of admission to the city
swimming pool from $1.50 to $2.00. That, however, is what the sweeping
definition of "license" and "fees" adopted by Roberts and urged by the
dissenters in Keller would require. The approach adopted by the majority in
Keller seems to be more sensible and realistic. 1" The people of Missouri
wanted to restrict the government's ability to tax them, and to keep the
government from disguising tax increases by using terms like "licenses" and
"fees." It seems unlikely that they wanted to clutter their ballots with the
question of whether public library fines may be increased.
B. An Invitation to Challenge Buechner v. Bond
Although the majority neatly disposed of the issue of whether user fees
are subject to the Hancock Amendment, they left us with the curious case of
footnote eleven. Near the end of the majority opinion it is stated that "Roberts
lifts the word 'fees' from its constitutional context, and attempts to define
'fees' as though it stood alone. The result of this error is that Roberts speaks
far too broadly to be of much use as precedent." 45 At that point, the
majority includes footnote eleven which states: "Buechner v. Bond, 650
S.W.2d 611 (Mo. banc 1983), partakes of the same error of reasoning, lifting
the word 'revenues' for [sic] the constitutional phrase 'total state revenues' to
interpret the Hancock Amendment in the most government-constricting
manner possible."' 46
Footnote eleven is unnecessary to the disposition of Keller. It contains
no reasoning that strengthens the position of the majority. Buechner v. Bond
is not even discussed in Keller. Footnote eleven appears to be an invitation
to challenge Buechner.
The Buechner court's task was to determine whether unspent revenue
from the 1979-80 fiscal year should be included in "total state revenues," an

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 24.
See Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302-05.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 305 n.11.
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element used in calculatingthe revenue limit under Section 18 of the Hancock
Amendment.'47 The majority took an unusual path in making its determination. Instead of taking the definition of "total state revenues" set out in
Article X, Section 17148 at face value, the majority looked at the term
"revenue" separately and looked to the dictionary to determine its meaning. 49 The definition of "revenue" used was "'the annual or periodical yield
of taxes, excises, customs, duties, and other sources or income that a nation,
state, or municipality collects and receives into the treasury for public
,use."""0 The majority declared that "[r]evenue is that amount generated in
a given fiscal year.""' Thus, the previous year's unspent funds did not fit
the "plain and ordinary" meaning of "revenue" and was not includable in "total
state revenues."'152 This caused the state's revenue limit to be set at a lower
figure than it otherwise would have been.
Chief Justice Edward D. Robertson, then Deputy Attorney General of the
State of Missouri, called the Buechner majority's method a "sleight of hand"
in a law review article. 5 1 That seems to be an accurate description.. As
then Chief Justice Albert Rendlen said in dissent,
The majority ...plucks the term "revenue" from its place in the phrase
"total state revenues" and defines it as though not a part of that phrase then
compounds the problem by lifting the phrase from its position in §17(1) and
redefines the phrase as though not a part of4 the section. In so doing it...
warps the meaning of the entire section."5
The method of reading terms employed by the Buechner majority was
rejected by the Missouri Supreme Court in Keller.'
As Judge Benton
wrote, "[c]ontext determines meaning.'1 6 In Buechner, the court found
meaning in spite of context.5 7 The Buechner approach is inconsistent with
the approach taken in Keller. The Missouri Supreme Court seems ready to
5
topple Buechner."'
Footnote eleven appears to be the court's way of asking
someone to allow it to do so.

147. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 612. See supra note 48 for the full text of § 18(a).
148. Mo. CONST. of 1945, art. X, § 17 (1980).
149. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 613.
150. Id. The definition came from WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1942 (1964).
151. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 613.
152. Id.
153. Robertson & Kincheloe, supra note 50, at 7.
154. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 616 (Rendlen, C.J., dissenting).
155. See Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302.
156. Id.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
158. The consequences ofthe reversal of Buechnerwould seem to be a higher revenue limit,
which would mean that the state government could collect a greater amount of money without
voter approval.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District is a giant step forward in
Missouri's approach to constitutional and statutory construction. The fiction
of "plain meaning" is gone, replaced by the more realistic approach adopted
by the majority that recognizes that "[c]ontext determines meaning." 59
In practical terms, Keller will likely be welcomed by financially-strapped
local governments and met with disdain by some citizens who believed that
the Hancock Amendment would prevent the increase of any fees without voter
approval. Presumably, it also will encourage a challenge to Buechnerv. Bond.
Whether the Keller majority simply views Buechner as a bad example of
constitutional construction needing correction, or they have some other
unstated motivation, Buechner's days appear to be numbered. Keller has
begun the eradication of the plain meaning rule in Missouri while increasing
the amount of money Missouri governments can collect without a vote of the
people. The fall of Buechner would continue each of these processes.
MICHAEL ATCHISON

159. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302.
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